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The problem of the gene
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Department of Biological Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA
Abstract – During the early 20th century the diverse practices of genetics were unified
by the concept of the gene. This classical gene was simultaneously a unit of structure,
function, mutation, and recombination. Starting in the 1940s, however, the classical
gene began to fragment. Today when we speak of a gene for some malady, a regulatory
gene, a structural gene, or a gene frequency, it is entirely possible that we are deploying
different gene concepts even though we are using the same term. The problem of the
gene addresses the fragmentation of the classical gene concept by asking to what extent
a comprehensive and unifying gene concept is possible or desirable. Fully comprehen-
sive gene concepts seem untenable today, but, within different disciplinary domains,
unifying, but non-comprehensive, gene concepts can be epistemically worthwhile. The
problem of the gene persists, however, not because of its epistemic value, but because of
its political value. Using both the arguments for newly proposed gene concepts and the
historical dispute over the classical gene, I argue that the desirability of gene concepts
rests in part on the political ramifications of their deployment and contestation. © 2000
Académie des sciences/Éditions scientifiques et médicales Elsevier SAS
Résumé – La problématique du gène. Au début du XXe siècle, les diverses pratiques
de la génétique furent unifiées grâce au concept de gène. Le gène « classique » était à la
fois une unité de structure, de fonction, de mutation et de recombinaison. À partir de
1940, le gène classique a commencé à se fragmenter. Aujourd’hui, lorsque nous parlons
d’un gène impliqué dans une maladie, d’un gène régulateur, d’un gène structural ou de
fréquences de gènes, il est tout à fait possible que, sous le même terme, nous fassions
référence à différents concepts de gène. En quelle mesure un concept global et
unificateur du gène est-il possible ou désirable? Il semble impossible aujourd’hui de
proposer un concept global, mais la recherche, à l’intérieur des différents domaines
disciplinaires, de concepts unificateurs peut être importante. Que la notion de gène reste
un problème ne vient pas des ambiguïtés de son usage scientifique, mais des enjeux
politiques qui y sont liés. En se basant à la fois sur les arguments qui ont été utilisés pour
justifier une nouvelle définition du gène, et sur les controverses qui ont agité la
génétique classique, je conclus que la nécessité de proposer de nouvelles définitions du
gène vient surtout des conséquences politiques de son utilisation ou de sa critique.
© 2000 Académie des sciences/Éditions scientifiques et médicales Elsevier SAS
1. Introduction
At the 100th anniversary of the publication of Gregor
Mendel’s paper, Milislav Demerec noted that during the
first half of the 20th century the gene had been regarded as
‘a unit of a genetic system, an indivisible entity in the
processes of recombination, self-reproduction and muta-
tion’ [1]. Writing as he was in 1965, Demerec knew that
the classical gene which had once unified structure, func-
tion, recombination, and mutation had been fragmented.
Perhaps because his own work on mutability had reluc-
tantly contributed to the dissolution of the classical gene
concept, Demerec’s commemorative essay makes its frag-
mentation an historical inevitability. Beginning with De
Vries and Correns, Demerec argued that supposedly ’Men-
delian’ characters in plants were not always so well
* Correspondence and reprints.
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behaved. Citing later work on variegation in plants, includ-
ing his own research, as well as research on step-allelism,
Demerec documented the genetics community’s growing
doubts about the indivisibility of the gene. Of course, to
Demerec’s list of work undermining the classical gene, we
could add H.J. Muller’s work on the position effect and
distribution of scute alleles, Richard Goldschmidt’s attacks
on the gene, and E.B. Lewis’s work on pseudo-alleles such
as the star, asteroid system [2–5]. In the intervening
35 years since Demerec wrote his essay, the classical gene
concept has been buried in a proliferation of molecular
genetic structures and processes. Phenomena such as the
various kinds of regulatory elements, different forms of
RNA splicing, satellite DNA, and pseudogenes seem to
guarantee that we cannot return to a comprehensive gene
concept [6–8]. Nevertheless, gene concepts still prove
irresistible to biologists and philosophers of biology.
The problem of the gene is rooted in the fragmentation
of the classical gene concept and asks to what extent a
comprehensive and unifying gene concept is possible or
desirable. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger recently posed the prob-
lem of the gene as this question, ‘Do molecular biologists
need a unified and generalized gene concept?’ [6].
Molecular biology is understood by Rheinberger as a
hybrid array of experimental systems ranging from bio-
physics and biochemistry to evolutionary genetics and
developmental genetics which produce a corresponding
array of gene concepts. From his perspective, it is not
‘necessary or even desirable to have a unified concept of
the gene in order to tie all of these disciplinary specializa-
tions together and to develop them in a coordinated
fashion’. In fact he argues that ‘an attempt to do so today
would produce nothing more than an exercise in rhetoric’
[6]. From a conceptual perspective, Rheinberger is cor-
rect. A single comprehensive gene concept is not needed
by molecular biologists or biologists in general. More
specific gene concepts, such as a developmental gene
concept or an evolutionary gene concept, are not valued
because they are fully comprehensive. Nevertheless, they
provide a means to unify or systematize circumscribed
disciplinary domains. When considering the problem of
the gene then we must drive a wedge between the scien-
tific values of generality and unification. The problem of
the gene should be decomposed into two problems: Is it
necessary or desirable to have a comprehensive or gener-
alized concept of the gene? and Is it necessary or desirable
to have a unifying concept of the gene? Rheinberger and
others have convincingly argued that we do not need a
comprehensive gene concept. The case against generality
does not extend to unification, however. Within different
disciplinary domains unifying, but non-comprehensive,
gene concepts can be epistemically worthwhile. The prob-
lem of the gene persists, however, not because of its
epistemic value, but because of its political value. To
paraphrase Pierre Bourdieu, epistemological problems are
always, inseparably, political problems [9]. Using both the
arguments for newly proposed gene concepts and the
historical dispute over the classical gene, I argue that the
desirability of gene concepts rests in part on the political
ramifications of their deployment and contestation.
2. Unifying the gene
Part of the allure of the classical gene lay in its ability to
unify significant aspects of the theory and practice of
genetics in the early 20th century. In Thomas Hunt Mor-
gan’s The Theory of the Gene, for instance, genes are
assumed to be stable, paired elements in the germinal
material which follow Mendel’s laws, exist in a linear
order on the chromosome, and remain in tact during
crossing over [10]. As such Morgan’s gene becomes a
common object for practices of determining patterns of
transmission, inferring linkage, and mapping. Later,
H.J. Muller and L.J. Stadler would make the gene the
object of the study of mutation as well [11, 12]. Accepting
the classical gene as a common object of research meant
accepting that different aspects of genetics were in fact
dealing with the same phenomena. In the eyes of philoso-
phers such as Michael Friedman this is what makes unifi-
cation valuable.
Although philosophers of science have typically dis-
cussed unification in conjunction with issues of explana-
tion, Friedman motivates his theory of explanatory unifi-
cation by appealing to phenomena. According to
Friedman, ‘science increases our understanding of the
world by reducing the total number of independent phe-
nomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given. A
world with fewer independent phenomena is, other things
being equal, more comprehensible than one with more’
[13]. The key to Friedman’s claim lies in defining what
counts as independent phenomena. Being an analytic
philosopher, Friedman quickly translates ’independent
phenomena’ into ’logically independent lawlike sentences’
and proceeds with his argument. We can resist the urge to
axiomatize, however, and allow that for practical pur-
poses whether phenomena are independent or not
depends on whether they are the common objects of
different scientific practices or not. Scientific practices are
operations involving theoretical and/or experimental sys-
tems. They can be individuated by noting differences in
operations (constructing a model, running a simulation,
performing an experiment) or in experimental systems
(Drosophila population cages versus bacterial chemostats,
for instance). Phenomena that form the common object of
many different scientific practices offer the opportunity to
find interconnections that will allow scientists to unify or
systematize their beliefs more readily than if no such
phenomena existed.
Consider a molecular gene concept recently proposed
by Ken Waters. Waters suggests that we speak of a gene as
‘a gene for a linear sequence of product at some stage of
genetic expression’ [14]. This definition allows Waters to
circumvent problems posed by the existence of introns
and mRNA splicing. Waters’ gene concept applies both to
the claim that there is a gene for a linear sequence of
mRNA and that there is a gene for a linear polypeptide
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sequence. So, systems with and without post-transcription
modifications can be described using the same term.
Waters’ definition provides a gene concept that unifies our
understanding of the gene as a coding region either with or
without further modification.
Waters’ gene concept has been criticized as doing noth-
ing to clarify the use of the term within molecular genetics.
While it may provide a more unified systematization of
beliefs, Eva Neumann-Held has argued that we are better
off describing the processes of polypeptide expression in
the more precisely defined terms already in use with in
molecular biology [15]. Neumann-Held’s argument is
motivated by her concern with what Waters left out.
According to Neumann-Held, Waters’ gene concept does
not include regulatory regions, yet regulatory regions are
necessary for his genes to produce any linear sequence. If
genes are thought of as ’making a polypeptide’, then
Waters’ definition leaves too much out. In its place,
Neumann-Held offers her own more inclusive gene con-
cept.
Neumann-Held proposes what she calls ’an expanded
constructionist gene concept’, which integrates DNA and
its developmental context. Instead of viewing the gene as
a DNA sequence, which is responsible for some linear
chemical product, Neumann-Held suggests that genes be
understood as ‘processes, which under certain environ-
mental conditions structure the DNA (and the mRNA) and
result in a polypeptide’ [15]. Although intentionally lim-
ited to processes which produce linear sequence prod-
ucts, this process view of the gene incorporates environ-
mental and developmental components as well as DNA
sequences, RNA sequences, and polypeptide sequences.
To further emphasize the importance of process, in col-
laboration with Paul Griffiths, Neumann-Held rechris-
tened her gene concept the ’molecular process gene con-
cept’ [16].
Griffiths and Neumann-Held want to make genes ’devel-
opmentally meaningful units’. Like Richard Goldschmidt
in Theoretical Genetics [17], Griffiths and Neumann-Held
argue that genes cannot be just DNA, because DNA can
not do anything. For them, overlapping genes mean that a
DNA sequence that functions as a promoter under one
circumstance could function as part of a open reading
frame in another. The function of a particular DNA
sequence is thus determined by its role in a ’developmen-
tal system’. In their words, ‘the gene is identified not with
these DNA sequences alone but rather with the process in
whose context these sequences take on a definite mean-
ing’ [16].
This gene concept, according to Neumann-Held, has
the advantage that ‘a research strategy is unsatisfactory
which only identifies ’genes’ (in the sense of DNA
sequences), but neglects (or postpones) research into the
mechanisms that make the ’genes’ effective in connection
with non-genetic…’ [15]. Or, as Griffiths and Neumann-
Held put it, because their gene concept emphasizes con-
nections to everything influencing expression from a DNA
sequence, their gene concept ‘helps scientists bear in
mind the easily overlooked fact that the production of this
polypeptide product is the result, not of the presence of the
DNA sequence alone, but of a whole range of resources
affecting gene expression’ [16]. As was her intent, the
molecular process gene concept is a ’developmentally
relevant gene concept’ [15].
Insofar as the proposed molecular process gene sub-
sumes a diverse array of phenomena, it is a unifying object
of research. However, by focusing on the unifying power
of these gene concepts I do not wish to suggest that the
epistemic worth of a gene concept can be reduced to
unifying power alone. Judgements of the epistemic worth
of a concept, like judgements of the epistemic worth of a
theory, incorporate and adjudicate between a variety of
values and criteria of which unification is only a part.
Nevertheless, part of Neumann-Held’s motivation is to
reclaim a small part of the ’Unity of Nature’ by using a
developmental systems approach. Griffiths and Neumann-
Held are very clear that the molecular process gene con-
cept is not a comprehensive gene concept: it does not
apply to DNA sequences that do not contribute to a linear
polypeptide and it is distinct from what they call the
evolutionary gene concept. Nevertheless, it unifies a large
array of phenomena (sequences with introns, exons, pro-
motors, and other regulatory elements as well as sequences
that must be processed and assembled). Indeed, the
molecular process gene concept seems to cover the entire
range of molecular phenomena that make up Petter Port-
in’s nine-fold classification of the molecular gene [8]. This
range is not accidental. Neumann-Held’s constructivist
gene concept was renamed the molecular process gene
concept, because it was intended to replace more tradi-
tional molecular gene concepts, such as Waters’, that do
not seem to cover the diversity of phenomena associated
with gene expression. Although presented as a philosophi-
cal argument concerning the epistemological value of a
gene concept, Griffith’s and Neumann-Held’s targeting of
the molecular gene and their advocacy of a developmen-
tal systems approach suggest an additional dimension to
the appeal of gene concepts.
3. Genes and politics
Much to the chagrin of some analytic philosophers of
science, scientists are rarely rational epistemic agents; by
which I mean, scientists rarely make judgements regarding
a theory, problem, or experiment on the basis of rational
consideration of purely epistemic criteria. A host of non-
epistemic concerns waits to complicate scientific decision
processes and turn the philosophers’ dream of logical
clarity into a sociological entanglement of interests, enrol-
ments, networks, values, and politics. A significant portion
of the appeal of gene concepts is derived from this socio-
logical context.
When Neumann-Held proposes her constructionist gene
concept and defends its conceptual usefulness, she also
engages in a struggle for authority in genetics that is almost
as old as the gene concept itself [18, 19]. Ever since
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Thomas Hunt Morgan argued for the separation of genet-
ics and embryology, there has been a perception that
geneticists have not taken developmental processes seri-
ously enough [20, 21]. Neumann-Held’s constructionist
gene concept can be seen as an attempt to reorient genet-
ics by making developmental biology a visible and essen-
tial component of the fundamental units of heredity. Instead
of development being the ’black box’ between the geno-
type and phenotype, the constructionist gene concept
makes the process of expression as important as its inputs
or outputs [16]. This redefinition creates the potential for a
redistribution of who is considered competent to speak to
fundamental issues involving the processes of expression;
in effect, it legitimizes a developmental approach to the
gene that would grant developmentally oriented molecu-
lar biologists greater scientific authority.
The struggle for authority underlies a great deal of the
internal political struggle in science. A scientist acts or
speaks with authority when she is judged to be both
technically competent and socially powerful. According
to Bourdieu, what is at stake in the competition for author-
ity is the power to impose a definition of what will count as
science. Naturally each scientist will prefer that definition
which favors him or her the most; ‘the definition most
likely to enable him to occupy the dominant position in
full legitimacy, by attributing the highest position in the
hierarchy of scientific values to scientific capacities that he
personally or institutionally possesses’ [9]. Gene con-
cepts, especially more comprehensive and unifying gene
concepts, represent one means of defining the field of
genetics; what problems it will consider important, what
experimental systems and organisms will be used, and
what assumptions will go unquestioned. As such the
struggle over gene concepts often is also a struggle for
scientific authority [19].
The struggle for authority in genetics has been histori-
cally located by Jan Sapp in Morgan’s theory of the gene.
While Neumann-Held and Griffiths do not historically
contextualize their process gene concept relative to Mor-
gan, the historical narrative that follows represents an
analogous situation in terms of the struggle for authority in
genetics. In both the contemporary and historical cases,
the problem of the gene is simultaneously an epistemic
and political problem.
Morgan made the theory of the gene the central concern
within Drosophila genetics in the early 20th century. Jan
Sapp has interpreted Morgan’s advocacy of the theory of
the gene as a means of demarcating which topics should
be considered to be legitimate topics for genetic research.
As such, the classical gene concept became part of an
early struggle for authority in genetics, according to Sapp.
Recently, however, Sapp’s analysis has come under attack
from Jon Harwood and Robert Kohler. Harwood has argued
that Sapp’s interpretation is plausible but ultimately uncon-
vincing because he does not develop his analysis of Ameri-
can scientific institutions [22]. I agree that more research
on the American institutional context for genetic research
is needed, but a full treatment of this history is beyond the
scope of the present paper. Kohler has argued pointedly
that Sapp’s interpretation, as well as Garland Allan’s inter-
pretation [18], portray Morgan’s Drosophila network as ‘a
’hegemonic’ establishment, from which genetics had to be
liberated by people with a broader biological outlook’
[21]. Kohler sees the choice made by Morgan to concen-
trate on transmission problems to be constrained by their
own very successful experimental system and the difficulty
of creating an equally successful system which would
address problems in evolutionary and developmental
genetics. In light of his own analysis of experimental
practice, Kohler warns that ‘we need to be less quick to
impute to historical actors the contentious cultural politics
of our own puritanical and sectarian age’ [21]. Of course
Kohler’s warning is worth heeding; Morgan and his asso-
ciates had enough contentious cultural politics without
importing any of our own.
Consider, for instance, the interactions between Mor-
gan’s group and that of Richard Goldschmidt. Goldschmidt
is remembered today largely for his ’heretical’ rejection of
the gene and his insistence on sudden evolution mediated
by systemic mutations. In the early 20th century, Gold-
schmidt was head of a division of the Kaiser-Wilhelm
Institute for Biology in Berlin and an influential geneticist
in his own right. Goldschmidt had a history of encounters
with Morgan and the fly group which concretely illustrate
the struggle for authority in genetics and the role of gene
concepts in that struggle.
From 1912 to 1936, Morgan’s fly group managed the
growing network of Drosophila researchers by managing
the concepts and the specialized stocks of flies needed to
do experimental work. In controlling the distribution of
stocks, they controlled the distribution of problems, and
the distribution of credit. As the group’s founder and
leader, Morgan maintained control well into the 1930s
when it was handed over to Sturtevant. With a few famous
exceptions, the fly group shared ideas and mutants freely.
Indeed Kohler argues that this openness and cooperation
were a result of the ‘unspoken rules of etiquette’ among
the Drosophilists. These rules mandated reciprocity, ‘the
privilege of receiving stocks entailed the obligation to
reciprocate’. They mandated disclosure, ‘recipients of
stocks were expected to tell donors what experiments they
planned to do and to keep them informed of what the
results were, especially if the results came a little too close
to the donor’s own line of work’. Lastly, they governed
ownership, problems could be temporarily owned but
tools could never be owned. In short, there were to be ‘no
trade secrets, no monopolies, no poaching, no ambushes’
[21]. This system of etiquette enabled the Drosophilists to
make such progress in genetics that by 1920 they domi-
nated the field [23].
The Drosophila network was extended to Richard Gold-
schmidt’s lab in Berlin when in 1926 Curt Stern literally
brought back both stocks of Drosophila from Pasadena
and the expertise to maintain and manipulate them. Up to
this point Goldschmidt’s reputation was based on his
extensive work on the genetics of sex determination in the
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Gypsy moth, Lymantria dispar. Underlying the course of
Goldschmidt’s research on sex determination from 1911
to 1934 was a theory of genetics that was physiologically
oriented. Where many American geneticists during this
time period, especially Drosophila geneticists, empha-
sized gene transmission, Goldschmidt emphasized gene
action. In other words, Goldschmidt thought that the
central question in genetics was the integration of the gene
with the physiological processes of development [23–26].
Using Drosophila, Goldschmidt continued to develop a
genetics that emphasized gene action.
Goldschmidt’s first published paper using Drosophila
landed like a bombshell within Morgan’s fly group.
Although Goldschmidt’s 1929 paper did not mark his first
run in with Morgan, it was his first attempt to make a claim
using Morgan’s experimental system [24]. In his paper,
Goldschmidt announced that he had been able to induce
massive mutations using temperature shocks administered
during early development [27]. At this time X-ray radiation
was the only known means for artificially inducing muta-
tions. Goldschmidt’s paper set the fly group into a frenzy
as they tried to replicate his results. At six different labora-
tories, Alfred Sturtevant, Jack Schultz, Helen Redfield,
Theodosius Dobzhansky, Harold Plough, Milislav
Demerec, H.J. Muller, A.S. Serebrovsky, L. Ferry, N. Sha-
piro, and B. Sidoroff all followed Goldschmidt’s proce-
dures as closely as possible, but were not able to produce
the effect [28, 29].
In a fashion typical of the Morgan’s Drosophila group,
the data from three of the replications were funneled via
Sturtevant to Jack Schultz who was given the job of writing
up the results [28]. Schultz’s paper was short and to the
point. After describing the pains taken to replicate the
experiments and the negative results, Schultz concluded
that Goldschmidt’s experimental mutations were in fact
experimental errors [30].
The concern with these failed replications was not
expressed to Goldschmidt directly but to Curt Stern [31].
Schultz kept Stern well informed of the progress or lack of
progress of the American Drosophilists but as he was
preparing his rebuttal to Goldschmidt in January of 1930 a
telegram from Stern arrived. It read: “Goldschmidt muta-
tions proved withhold manuscript” [32]. Victor Jollos had
replicated Goldschmidt’s results [33]. Schultz did with-
hold the manuscript, but, according to Franz Schrader, a
cytologist close to the fly group and a close friend of
Stern’s, not all of the Drosophilists appreciated Stern’s
warning. In a letter to Stern, Schrader wrote:
‘It has become known that you warned Schultz not to
publish his anti-Goldschmidt findings in re [sic] the tem-
perature mutations. The general opinion at Woods Hole
last summer [the summer of 1930] was that that was not
exactly the right thing to do, in view of the loudly voiced
conviction of the Pasadena people that Goldschmidt has
done very bad work on it. I think myself that you should
have let them go right ahead and make damn fools of
themselves. They have come around to so many of Gold-
schmidt’s views after laughing at him that I think a good
fall is just about coming to them’ [34].
Schultz never published his manuscript, but Demerec
who had sent his data to Schultz did arrange for all of the
data to be exhibited (probably as posters) at the Interna-
tional Congress of Genetics held in 1932 in Ithaca, NY
[35]. Undoubtedly, the overwhelming number of negative
replications created the impression that Goldschmidt’s
original experiments were questionable as were Jollos’
replications. This is precisely what Schultz and the Droso-
philists wanted, although even Schultz hesitated to say so
directly. Schultz’s reply to Demerec’s query about exhib-
iting the results ends with the statement, ‘From what you
write, I suspect that there will be a representative collec-
tion of negative experiments ... in this field’. Schultz had
crossed out his original conclusion which read, ‘From
what you write, I suspect that there will be a representative
collection of negative experiments against which the oth-
ers will seem wr[ong] ... ’ [36].
Goldschmidt’s dramatic entrance into the world of
Drosophila genetics is significant because this episode
ultimately questioned his technical competence. While he
may not have ever been popular among all of the members
of the fly group, in the 1920s and 1930s, he did have their
respect due in large part to his extensive research record
and his position in Germany. The temperature shock
experiments began to erode Goldschmidt’s authority
within the fly group. This process was hastened when
Goldschmidt was forced to immigrate to the United States
in 1936 and announced loudly and often that the theory of
the gene was dead. Goldschmidt reports that his oppo-
nents did not refrain from stating, often in his presence,
that he had gone crazy [37–39].
Goldschmidt’s rejection of the classical gene was the
result of his strong belief in the power of position effects
combined with his own research on spontaneous muta-
tion. A position effect occurs when the location of a piece
of genetic material alters the effects of that material. Posi-
tion effects were problematic for the classical theory of the
gene because it meant that the function of a gene did not
fully reside within the gene itself.
Typical of Goldschmidt’s papers attacking the classical
gene was a short article published in the Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences [40]. In this paper,
Goldschmidt used results from his experiments on spon-
taneous mutability in Florida stocks of Drosophila to argue
against the existence of the gene. In a letter to L.C. Dunn,
Goldschmidt admitted that the article would make him ‘an
outcast in genetics’, since he ‘now stated in writing, as
before only orally, that there is no such thing as a gene.
Horror!’ [41]. Goldschmidt’s view was that the burst of
mutations he and others had witnessed were the result of
chromosomal rearrangements, not gene mutations.
Goldschmidt was right about the reaction he would get.
In a letter to Demerec, Theodosius Dobzhansky wrote:
“I have just read Goldschmidt’s paper in PNAS. This is
all we need. But what a series of illogical statements! Even
assuming that his facts are straight (and I am personally
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more inclined to think that he has a wholesale contami-
nation of cultures) his conclusions absolutely do not fol-
low! I am really sorry for the old man, because I have a
liking [sic] and respect for him” [42].
Not being a shy person, Dobzhansky let Goldschmidt
know what he thought of this and other papers attacking
the classical gene. Goldschmidt being who he was, did
not stop publishing his views, although he did modify
them [23]. In correspondence, Demerec and Dobzhanksy
discussed how best to respond to Goldschmidt’s chal-
lenge. Dobzhanksy rejected the idea of treating Gold-
schmidt’s views with a ‘conspiracy of silence’, because he
liked Goldschmidt and continued to admire him, which
he says made it unpleasant for him to listen to Sturtevant
and others in the fly group ‘who have nothing but con-
tempt and ill will for the old man’ [43]. Nevertheless,
Demerec and Dobzhanksy did draft a paper responding to
Goldschmidt’s attack on the gene. Although it was never
published, it reveals much about how Demerec and
Dobzhanksy viewed the classical gene.
In their manuscript, The Validity of the Gene Theory,
Demerec and Dobzhanksy claim that ‘by far the most
important among the doctrines on which is founded the
edifice of modern genetics is the theory of the gene’.
Likening the gene to molecules, atoms, protons, and elec-
trons in physics and chemistry, they argued that the gene
was the ‘fundamental biological unit’. Indeed, they argue
that ‘it was the advent of the gene theory that has permitted
the transformation of genetics from a descriptive to an
exact science’. Given such a build up, you would think
that Goldschmidt’s views would be in for rough treatment.
Demerec and Dobzhanksy reject Goldschmidt’s attacks
on the gene, but they do it in a very careful way. They
claim that something as important as the theory of the gene
needs to be carefully evaluated from time to time so that it
can be improved and strengthened. For many years, they
claim, the gene has had no serious challengers, but, in
their words, ‘quite recently ... a person so authoritative as
Goldschmidt ... has flatly denied the reality of the exist-
ence of genes’. They go on to say they believe that Gold-
schmidt has a done ‘a service to genetics’, but that the
gene will emerge from this trial ‘unscarred’ [44].
At the time Demerec and Dobzhanksy were writing this
manuscript, other members of the fly group were review-
ing Goldschmidt’s submissions to Genetics and rejecting
them [23]. Even Goldschmidt’s friend, Curt Stern, had
serious doubts about Goldschmidt’s work and its effects
on his standing in the field. In a letter to L.C. Dunn asking
about a paper Goldschmidt had submitted to Genetics,
Stern wrote, ‘It is indeed a very painful experience for me
to read this paper and it makes one strongly doubtful of
many things. I am quite of your opinion that the publica-
tion of this paper would harm the author very much and I
agree with you in trying, at least, to avoid this .... My first
reaction regarding this paper was to write a frank letter to
Goldschmidt and tell him how he made people wonder
about his recent work. However, I agree with you that the
style of this paper shows so definitely that outside criti-
cisms would not be effective that I feel much at a loss and
don’t know what to do.’ [45]. Dunn decided not to publish
the paper and it is not clear that Stern ever wrote his letter
to Goldschmidt.
These episodes reveal the extent to which certain play-
ers within the genetics community considered the per-
sonal and political ramifications of Goldschmidt’s attack
on the gene. Goldschmidt himself was willing to gamble
his standing in part be cause he thought he would even-
tually be shown to be right, in part because his style of
research was to theorize first and experiment later, and in
part because he keenly felt his own loss of status when he
was forced to leave Berlin for Berkeley [23]. Demerec,
Dobzhanksy, and Stern saw the Goldschmidt’s attack on
the gene as a strategy which would further degrade the
perceptions of his competence and authority within Droso-
phila genetics and genetics in general. Indeed as Gold-
schmidt persisted and expanded his views in the 1940s,
Dobzhanksy’s responses became less charitable.
Dobzhanksy’s response to Goldschmidt’s The Material
Basis of Evolution (1940), for instance, was much more
pointed and was undoubtedly partly a result of the fact that
Goldschmidt had chided Dobzhansky in print for his
unwillingness to give up the particulate gene [46]. In fact,
an important facet of Goldschmidt’s argument rested on a
systematic reinterpretation of Dobzhansky’s research as it
was presented in his Genetics and the Origin of Species
(1937).
In terms of the classical gene concept, these responses
to Goldschmidt’s attacks reveal the place given to the gene
as a fundamental feature of genetic research among the
members of the fly group. Morgan’s control over the
distribution network may have regulated experimental
practice, but his theory of the gene helped regulate the
conceptual frameworks that were simultaneously being
deployed. Morgan’s success at making the gene founda-
tional is evidenced by how quickly Demerec, Dobzhanksy,
and Stern saw the political consequences when Gold-
schmidt questioned its existence. Questioning the gene,
questioned the conceptual framework for Drosophila
genetics. In doing so it questioned Morgan’s authority and
the authority of his successor (Sturtevant) and his associ-
ates to conceptualize the field.
4. Conclusion
An important part of what makes a comprehensive or
unifying gene concept attractive is that it makes a certain
set of disciplinary concerns central to everyone who then
uses the concept. Concepts which are comprehensive or
which unify large domains become obligatory points of
passage if they are accepted. As such, gene concepts can
be very powerful tools for defining a field or at a minimum
having a significant impact on a field’s conceptual frame-
work. This does not mean that they are necessary or
universally desirable. Molecular biologists seem to be in
no way hindered by the absence of a unifying gene con-
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cept. Nevertheless, Neumann-Held and Griffiths find value
in offering a molecular process gene concept. This gene
concept is not meant to be comprehensive. Its more lim-
ited scope grants it a modest unifying power. The real
impact of the molecular process gene lies in its conceptual
reorientation – it would force us to shift our focus from
genetic structures to developmental processes. The value
of this reorientation is currently being debated and as a
result we still face the problem of the gene. But even if the
discussion of the molecular process gene concept were to
end tomorrow, we would continue to face the problem of
the gene as new gene concepts are proposed and debated.
The problem of the gene resists attempts at resolution by
conceptual means, because it is not a wholly conceptual
problem. Deploying a gene concept is also exercise in
scientific authority. The classical gene concept embodied
Morgan’s authority as well as his ability to manage his
network of researchers and impose his definition of sci-
ence upon the field. Goldschmidt’s attack on the classical
gene was in part an attack on the authority of the fly group.
In attacking the gene, Goldschmidt sought to reorder the
field conceptually and politically. While today’s struggles
over gene concepts are not nearly as dramatic as Gold-
schmidt’s, they are similar enough to suggest that we will
continue to confront the problem of the gene for as long as
there are struggles for authority which use gene concepts
to attempt to realign the problems and practices of genet-
ics.
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